





 Forthcoming in Political Studies  The notion of human rights  is one of  the most politically powerful  ideas of our time.  Since  their  appearance  in  the  1948  Universal  Declaration,  human  rights have  been  the  object  of  intense  political  discussion  as  well  as  philosophical theorizing.  Until  very  recently,  the  dominant  philosophical  approach  to  the analysis of human rights has followed natural‐law theory. On this view, there are normatively  salient  interests  attached  to  our  status  as  human  beings,  and  the task  of  human  rights  is  to  protect  them.  In  other  words,  human  rights  are fundamental moral rights people enjoy solely by virtue of their humanity. This ‘natural­law approach’1 to human rights has been variously advocated by theorists such as Alan Gewirth (1982), James Griffin (2008), and John Tasioulas (2009).  Central  to  this  view  is  the  idea  that  the  function  of  human  rights  is independent  of  the  existing  political  reality  of  human  rights.  To  establish whether something (X) qualifies as a human right we need not  look at human‐                                                        
∗  I  was  prompted  to  write  this  paper  after  attending  a  talk  by  Jeremy Waldron,  on  ‘Human Rights  and  the  Doctrine  of  Imago  Dei’,  and  one  by  Allen  Buchanan  on  ‘The  Egalitarianism  of Human Rights’, both at the University of Oxford, in May and February 2009 respectively. I thank both speakers for their engaging and stimulating presentations. I am also grateful to Peter Bailey, Christian List, the audience at the CAPPE seminar (ANU, July 2009), three anonymous reviewers and Political Studies co‐editor Matthew Festenstein for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
1 The approach is often labelled ‘orthodox’ or ‘traditional’. 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ii. A view of human rights can be political with respect to its justification, if it appeals to reasons which are or can be publicly endorsed (Sections 2 and 3).   iii. A  view  of  human  rights  can  be  political  with  respect  to  feasibility constraints, if its content depends on what is reasonably feasible in current 
political circumstances (Section 4).  Second, I assess the merits of i, ii and iii, with a view to establishing whether it is plausible to think of human rights as political in any of these senses. I conclude that  we  can  plausibly  regard  human  rights  as  political  in  relation  to  their 
iudicandum,  but  should  be  somewhat  sceptical  about  political  justifications  for human  rights,  and  fully  sceptical  about  placing  certain  kinds  of  feasibility constraints  on  them.  Taken  together,  these  conclusions  suggest  that  the  most plausible  political  approach  to  human  rights  is  closer  to  natural‐law  theories than proponents of the political view typically acknowledge. Before  getting  started,  let  me  make  one  prefatory  remark.  Although  what should  count  as  a  human  right  clearly  depends  on  the  particular  approach  to human rights one adopts,  in  the paper  I make  the  following  three assumptions which  are  endorsed  by  proponents  of  both  the  natural‐law  and  the  political approach.  First,  by  a  right  I mean, with  Joseph Raz  (1986)  an  interest weighty enough  to place duties on others  to respect or protect  it. Rights so understood are what Wesley Hohfeld (1919) called ‘claim rights’,  i.e., rights that are always correlative  to  duties.  Second,  human  rights  are  rights  of  special  moral significance which protect people’s most important interests. So, for instance, the 
  5 
right not to be pinched and the right not to be lied to might be valid moral rights but they cannot plausibly qualify as human rights (Eddy 2007, 315). By contrast, the rights to life and to freedom of movement clearly fall within the category of human rights. Third, and finally, human rights are universal: they are possessed by each and every human being.6  It  is  on  the basis of  these  three assumptions that I conduct my discussion in what follows.   
1. Human Rights and Political Institutions 
For  proponents  of  (some  versions  of)  the  natural‐law  approach,  human  rights are particularly important rights held by each person against every other person. On  this view,  if  Sarah gets mugged on her way home and  is badly  injured as a result, she can be said to have suffered a human‐right violation. In particular, her rights to property and physical integrity have been infringed (cf. Pogge 2000, 47‐8). Similarly, if Mary’s tyrannical father prevents her from leaving her house, on the natural‐law model, we would have to say that her human right to freedom of movement has been infringed.  These judgments may appear somewhat counterintuitive. To be sure, Sarah’s and Mary’s  rights  are  violated,  but  do  such  violations  amount  to human­rights violations? It would seem not, at least if we consider how most people think and talk  about  human  rights.  Proponents  of  the  political  view  have  a  simple 
                                                        
6 For proponents of the natural‐law view, persons have human rights solely by virtue of being human.  For  proponents  of  the  political  view,  the  existence  of  human  rights  requires  the  joint presence of human beings and (certain kinds of) political institutions. It is, however, true for both views that, in the world as it is, every human being is in principle a human‐rights holder. 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explanation  for  this.  The  rights  violations  involved  in  our  examples  are  not human‐rights  violations  because  human  rights  have  an  eminently  political nature.  Whenever  talk  of  human  rights  is  in  play,  so  they  argue,  the  relevant duty‐bearers are not other individuals but political institutions. Human rights do not  tell  us  how  we  should  act  towards  one  another.  Instead,  they  define standards of conduct applicable to political arrangements. This is why, unlike the cases of Mary and Sarah, arbitrary expropriation or confinement on the part of the state intuitively strike us as human‐rights violations (Pogge 2002).7 Although proponents of the political view agree that human rights constitute standards for the conduct of political institutions, this claim is very general and can be  interpreted  in different ways.  In particular, we can distinguish between two  types  of  interpretations,  each  corresponding  to  a  version  of  the  political approach. I shall call them the narrow and the wide version.  
1.1. The Narrow Version On  the  narrow  version  of  the  political  view,  human  rights  set  standards  for states’  foreign policy, and particularly for the  legitimacy of  foreign intervention (Sangiovanni 2008, 154; Raz 2007, 9; Rawls 1999).8  In other words,  they place 
                                                        
7  Note,  however,  that  Pogge  (2010,  199‐200)  has  recently  adopted  a more  ecumenical  view, suggesting  that  human  rights  need  not  be  exclusively  political  (or  ‘institutional’).  While  he previously rejected what he called the ‘interactional’ view, he is now agnostic about it. 
8  There  are  differences  between  these  authors’  views.  Sangiovanni  focuses  on  foreign intervention  but  admits  that  there  are  possibly  other  functions  played  by  human  rights  in international  affairs.  Raz  only  talks  about  foreign  intervention,  but  does  not  limit  this  idea  to 
coercive  intervention.  For  him,  foreign  intervention  includes  non‐coercive  measures  and 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limits on state sovereignty.9 As Joseph Raz (2007, 9) puts  it  ‘[s]overeignty does not  justify  state  actions,  but  it  protects  states  from  external  interference. Violation  of  human  rights  disables  this  response,  which  is  available  to  states regarding other misdeeds’. Whenever a state violates human rights, proponents of  the  narrow  view  argue,  it  no  longer  enjoys  immunity  from  external intervention,  be  it  military  intervention  or  some  ‘softer’  form  of  intervention such as diplomatic or economic sanctions. By  focusing  on  the  legitimacy  of  international  intervention,  the  narrow version of the political view is tied to the state system. On this view, the relevant institutions which ought to be evaluated by reference to human‐rights standards are states.  International organizations,  international corporations, NGOs and so forth  cannot  qualify  as  human‐rights  violators  on  this  account.  Moreover,  the account not only restricts violations of human rights to ‘state actions’, but it links such  violations  to  foreign  policy  in  particular.  Whatever  standards  of  justice legitimize a state domestically, if these do not include human‐rights norms (or if                                                         sanctions.  Finally,  Rawls  places  great  emphasis  on  foreign  intervention,  but  also  thinks  that human  rights  are  a  necessary  condition  for  the  internal  legitimacy  of  states  –  i.e.,  they  set minimal conditions for social cooperation. See Tasioulas (2009), for discussion of the differences between Rawls and Raz in particular. 
9  Tasioulas  (2009)  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  the  ‘coercive  intervention  account’ (CIA) of human rights, defended by John Rawls, and the ‘broad intervention account’ (BIA) which also  includes  non‐coercive  intervention,  defended  by  Raz.  Tasioulas’s  distinction  is more  fine‐grained  than  the one  I  am discussing here  (i.e.,  that between narrow and wide versions of  the political  view).  In  particular,  the  CIA  and  BIA  can  both  be  subsumed  under  what  I  call  the ‘narrow’ version. My objections to the narrow version are  in  line with Tasioulas’s objections to the CIA and BIA. 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such norms are not adhered  to),  that  state  is  liable  to being  interfered with by others.  At  first  sight  there  seems  to  be  an  obvious  difficulty  with  this  account  of human  rights:  it  is  implausibly  tied  to  the  status  quo.  As  I  have  noticed,  the narrow view presupposes  the existence of  the state system more‐or‐less as we know it. But what if we were to move towards a different kind of world order? Would  we  be  forced  to  say  that  human  rights  no  longer  exist  under  those changed conditions, because the very idea of foreign intervention would become unnecessary? By  tying  talk of human  rights  to  the  current  configuration of  the international  system,  the  narrow  view  makes  the  notion  of  human  rights implausibly contingent on the way the world happens to be organized here and now (see Tasioulas 2009, 946).   This  being  the  case, why  should one want  to  restrict  the  function of  human rights in the way proponents of the narrow version of the political approach do? In answer to this question, advocates of this view typically point to the existing international  practice  of  human  rights.  As  Sangiovanni  (2008,  155)  puts  it ‘human  rights  serve  to  justify  various  forms  of  (coercive  and  noncoercive) interference  in  the  internal affairs of other  states’. This  is what,  following  John Rawls, advocates of  the narrow view take to be the  function of human rights.10 But is it plausible to attribute such a narrow function to them? 
                                                        
10  It  should  be  noted  that  Sangiovanni  (2008,  154  n.  39)  does  admit  that  there  are  many dimensions  to  the  international  practice  of  human  rights.  However,  like  Raz  and  Rawls,  he chooses  ‘the  justification of  foreign  intervention’  as being  ‘arguably  the  central  case  in  current international practice’ (154). 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to achieve in order to count as legitimate. In the words of Thomas Pogge (2000, 52):  ‘a  human  right  to  X  is  tantamount  to  declaring  that  every  society  (and comparable social system) ought  to be so organized  that all  its members enjoy secure access to X.’ On this account, political  institutions broadly conceived are the bearers of the duties correlative to human rights, and what sorts of sanctions would  be  appropriate  in  cases  of  human‐rights  violations  remains  an  open question.  The obvious advantage of this view, compared to its narrow counterpart, is its robustness  across  different  configurations  of  the  world’s  political  order.  For instance,  in a world of  states, one could argue  that human rights set  standards for  internal  legitimacy  and,  when  violated,  they  trigger  external  intervention. One  might  posit  a  shared  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  international community  to  ensure  that  human  rights  are  fulfilled  worldwide.  Whenever  a state  violates  its  citizens’  human  rights,  humanitarian  intervention  (through appropriate  decision‐making  mechanisms  fairly  distributing  the  burdens  of intervention between different  states) would be warranted  in  the same way  in which the state’s intervention to punish and deter criminals is warranted in the domestic context (see Nardin 2006).  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  were  to  live  under  a  world  government,  the distribution  of  responsibilities  for  the  protection  of  human  rights  would probably be different. We would not have a two‐tier structure (i.e., states and the international community) but some different allocation of duties on the basis of the nature of the political system in question.  Moreover,  the  wide  account  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  narrow  one  not  only because it is more robust across different configurations of the world’s political 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order, but also because it is more faithful to current human‐rights discourse and practice.  Indeed,  contemporary  human  rights  seem  essentially  to  function  as standards of global  justice. They set out what every human being  is entitled  to simply by virtue of her humanity, and condemn as morally  flawed any political system which fails to secure them (see Beitz 2001).  So  far,  we  have  seen  that  the  wide  version  of  the  political  view  is  at  an advantage compared to the narrow one. However, this advantage is meaningful only  if  the wide  version  can  offer  a  plausible  theoretical  account  of  what  ‘the political’  is.  The  narrow  version  can  simply  rely  on  the  familiar  thought  that states represent the political domain par excellence, and need not interrogate the special  reasons  which  identify  a  certain  realm  of  human  action  as  political. Advocates  of  the wide  version  cannot  remain  equally  silent  on  this matter.  So what makes a certain institution, or social arrangement, political? Proponents  of  the  wide  version  have  not  dwelt  on  this  question  at  great length, and a fully satisfactory treatment of it goes well beyond the scope of this paper.12  I will  therefore  limit myself  to suggesting that any plausible answer to our  question  must  refer  to  the  sort  of  inescapability  which  typically characterizes  state  institutions  (i.e.,  what  I  called  the  political  realm  par 




cannot  subtract  ourselves.13  This  is  why  states,  some  powerful  international organizations,  and  the  practices  of  international  finance  and  trade  may  be regarded  as  ‘political’.  They  are political  to  the  extent  that  they determine our opportunities and life prospects in virtually unavoidable ways. Most  people  can  decide whether  to  become members  of  a  particular  dining club  or  arts  association,  but  they  are  not  equally  free  to  decide whether  to  be members  of  a  state  or  to  participate  in  international  finance  and  trade.  These institutions and practices are,  in some sense,  imposed upon us and this  is why, from  a  liberal  perspective  (namely  the  perspective  adopted  in  this  paper),  the effects they have on individuals’ interests and life prospects need to be justified by appeal to stringent moral standards: human rights (cf. Rawls 1996 and 1999b, and Pogge 2002).14 This last point leads us to the next section, where I shall look at the justification of human rights.                                                          
13 This way of defining what counts as a political domain is very much in line with, and inspired by, Rawls’s (1999a) characterization of the ‘basic structure of society’.  
14 A reviewer has pointed out that this criterion might be over‐inclusive. For example, arguably families also determine our opportunities and life prospects in virtually unavoidable ways. This, in  turn, means that  the  family  itself qualifies as a political  institution on my account. There are two possible replies to this challenge. The first, concessive reply, would simply acknowledge that the  family  is  indeed  political.  This  is  not  an  unfamiliar  thought,  especially  in  feminist writings (with their popular slogan ‘the personal is political’). Of course, this would stretch the domain of the  political  well  beyond  what  proponents  of  the  political  view  would  be  willing  to  accept. Luckily,  this  is  not  the  only  answer  available  to  them.  For  the  way  in  which  one’s  family determines one’s  life prospects  is,  to a  large extent, dependent on what  the state  itself does.  In modern societies, it is the state’s job to make sure that families are structured in such a way as to make it possible for their members to have decent life prospects. It is the state which lays down 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2. Human Rights and Public Justifiability 
A second dimension along which human rights might be understood as political is the way they are justified. Human rights are ‘political’ in this sense if they can be endorsed from a variety of different overall ethical and moral outlooks, what Rawls  (1996)  would  call  ‘comprehensive  doctrines’.  For  instance,  a  theory  of human rights resting on theological foundations would fail to be political from a justificatory perspective. The claim that human beings are endowed with human rights  because  they were  created  ‘in  the  image  of  God’  could  not  be  endorsed from the standpoint of different comprehensive doctrines. Only those who hold certain  religious  views  can  accept  the  doctrine  of  Imago  Dei  as  a  plausible foundation for human‐rights principles (Waldron 2009). Why should we want an account of human rights to be justifiable in the eyes of people whose moral convictions, conceptions of the good, and outlooks on life differ? There are at least two possible answers to this question. The first invokes the value of stability. Given existing cultural differences and value pluralism, an account  of  human  rights  can  stably  govern  international  politics  only  if  it  is capable of being upheld from different cultural and moral perspectives.    
                                                        children’s  and  women’s  rights,  and  is  in  charge  of  making  sure  that  these  are  respected. Moreover,  in  a  just  state,  there wouldn’t  be  huge wealth  disparities  across  families, which  are nowadays some of the main determinants of people’s different opportunities and life prospects. These disparities are once again the product of the state’s lack of appropriate regulation. In short, the extent to which families determine our life prospects (at a macro‐level) is for the most part a function of how the state itself is organized. For further reflections along similar lines see Rawls (2001, 162‐8). 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If  stability  is  what  we  are  primarily  concerned  with,  then  we  have  good reasons to defend a conception of human rights which lies in the area of overlap between  the different political and ethical  cultures existing  in  the world  today. To make our doctrine politically  justified, we take such cultures as a given, and then  identify  the areas where  they  intersect. This would ensure a high  level of compliance with  human‐rights  norms,  and  hence  stability,  at  least  in  the  here and now.  The problem with  this  strategy  is  that, however appealing  it might be  from the  viewpoint  of  stability,  it  is  obviously  unacceptable  from  a  moral  point  of view. All  this approach to human rights would do  is  legitimizing  the status quo (Beitz 2001, 272‐3 and Cohen 2004, 200). Needless to say, a normative account of  human  rights  should  offer  us  a  standpoint  from  which  to  evaluate  and,  if necessary, criticize existing practices, and not simply affirm the status quo. This being  the  case,  we  should  abandon  the  stability‐based  defence  of  a  political justification  of  human  rights  and  turn  to  what  I  call  the  ‘respect  for  persons’ account (or just ‘respect’ for brevity). Central  to  this  account  is  the  following  idea:  political  norms  in  general,  and human‐rights norms in particular, are meant to govern institutions which have a deep impact on our lives and from which we cannot subtract ourselves. A liberal commitment  to  respect  for  persons  qua  rational  and  autonomous  agents requires that the principles governing these sorts of institutions be justifiable to them.  Paternalistically  imposing  ethical  norms  on  others  is  morally  wrong because it shows a lack of appreciation for their equal status as rational agents. On  this  reading,  the  need  for  a  ‘public’  justification  of  human  rights  follows directly from liberal normative individualism. 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This gives us moral grounds for resorting to a ‘political’ justification of human rights.  But  how  is  this  morally  grounded  political  justification  supposed  to proceed?  Following  Rawls  (1996  and  1999b),  we  might  think  that  a  political justification  for human rights needs to draw on the shared public  international culture,  trying  to  interpret  and  articulate  its  fundamental  moral  ideals.  Only principles that are  justified in this way can be endorsed from the standpoint of the  different  cultures  and  value‐systems  characterizing  the world  in which we live. Call this the ‘interpretive approach’ to public justification. Let us see how we might construct an account of human rights out of it.  To start with, we have to look at the public human‐rights culture. But how are we to identify it? We have already ruled out the ‘greatest common denominator’ approach  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  unreasonably  status­quo biased.  Should we look  at  international  Covenants  and  Charters?  Should  we  take  what  activists think  of  as  human  rights  as  definitive  of  the  concept?  Should  we  look  at  the philosophical  literature?  It  immediately  appears  that  identifying  what  can  be legitimately defined as a public culture of human rights is not an easy task. If we took into account everything that is couched in the language of human rights, we would  inevitably  end  up  with  a  deeply  unsystematic  account  of  what  human rights are. As  I  noted  earlier,  the  practice  of  human  rights  is multifaceted.  In  fact,  one could  say,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  practice  of  human  rights  (Sangiovanni 2008).  There  are  many  practices  which  are  legitimized  by  appeal  to  human rights, so many that they seem to make an interpretive approach to the design of a  unitary  list  of  human  rights  a  non‐starter.  Either  we  select  one  particular aspect  of  the  practice  (as  proponents  of  the  narrow  view  do),  but  that  seems 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arbitrary,  or  we  are  left  with  too  heterogeneous  an  account  of  ‘what  is  to  be interpreted’ to offer a compelling interpretation of it. At this point advocates of the interpretive methodology might protest that the picture  I  am  offering  is  too  bleak.  For  the  interpretive  methodology  does  not hinge  on  an  accurate  description  of  what  human‐rights  practice  consists  of. Instead,  it  is  meant  to  pick  out  and  articulate  the  moral  values  that  inform human‐rights practice (James 2005, Dworkin 1986 ch. 2).  Although the practice itself  is  varied and heterogeneous,  the values underpinning  it need not be. For instance,  in  Political  Liberalism  Rawls  argues  that  the  values  informing  the practice  of  social  cooperation  in  liberal  democratic  societies  are  freedom  and equality. Similarly, one could argue that a concern with human dignity lies at the heart of contemporary human‐rights practice in its different forms (See Donnelly 1999, and UDHR, Preamble and Art. 1).  This  sounds  like  a  plausible  conclusion.  But  notice  that  the  answer  to  the question of what human dignity  is, and how  it  should be articulated  in a set of rights,  cannot  be  found  simply  by  looking  at  human‐rights  practice  itself.  As  I said before, human‐rights practice  is  ‘too messy’,  and a philosophical  theory of human rights is precisely meant to allow us to bring some order to, and evaluate, it. Once we dig deep enough  into our human‐rights practices  and  find  that  the value underpinning them is human dignity (or an analogue thereof), we are left with  a  philosophical  puzzle  about  what  human  dignity  itself  requires.  As proponents of the interpretive approach acknowledge (Dworkin 1986, ch. 2), the interpretation  and  articulation of  the  values  informing  specific  practices  is  not itself practice‐dependent, but is carried out through first‐order moral reasoning.
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concern with human dignity grounds a human right against torture, the status of other  rights,  such  as  the  right  to  political  participation  or  to  freedom  of association, in relation to human dignity is more controversial. This means that even a political  justification of human rights will have to be somewhat partisan after  all.  One’s  overall  ethical  commitments  will  inevitably  influence  one’s favoured interpretation of human dignity, or of whatever value is found to be at the heart of human‐rights practice.  From a heuristic point of view, focusing on human‐rights practice might help us identify the specific values which human rights are meant to protect. So long as  such  values  are  stated  sufficiently  generally,  public  justifiability  might  be achievable. However, once we move from a general statement of these values to specific  articulations  of  what  they  require,  disagreements  across  cultures  and persons  are  bound  to  arise.  A  genuinely  publically  justified  theory  of  human rights,  then, will  have  to be  relatively  thin,  and  it  is not  clear  that  the value of public  justification  is  so  weighty  as  to  warrant  sacrificing  other  substantive moral  commitments  (such  as  the  commitment  to  freedom  of  association  and democratic participation).  Even if the contested nature of dignity breeds scepticism about the possibility of  developing  a  sufficiently  rich  and  yet  publically  justified  theory  of  human rights, I suggest that a focus on dignity might still  lend plausibility to a political approach to human rights, but from the perspective of their iudicandum.  
3. Human Dignity and Human Rights as Political 
Let  us  begin  by  trying  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  idea  of  human dignity. This is a rather elusive notion, and as I said, it is not my intention to offer 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a  detailed  account  of  what  respect  for  dignity  consists  of.  By  way  of  first approximation, however, we might  say  that  the  concept of dignity  indicates an attribute human beings possess by virtue of  their nature as  free and purposive agents.17 Respect for dignity therefore requires appropriate acknowledgement of human  agency  and  its  value.18 When  the  value  of  human  agency  is  adequately acknowledged, persons can be said to lead lives of dignity. In particular, leading a life  of  dignity  involves  both  conceiving  of  oneself  as  an  agent  with  inherent worth, and public recognition of one’s status as a purposive, inherently valuable, being.  In  Joshua  Cohen’s words:  ‘having  a  sense  of  dignity,  we want  others  to recognize  that we have aims and aspirations and  to acknowledge  the worth of those aims and aspirations by, inter alia, providing conditions (…) that enable us to pursue them’ (Cohen 1997, 115).  In  sum,  a  person may  be  said  to  lead  a  life  of  dignity  only  if  she  thinks  of herself, behaves, and is treated by others, as an agent worthy of respect. A life of dignity is a life of self‐respect as well as of respect on the part of others, where the two are mutually dependent and supportive. How does the ‘political’ realm fit into this picture?  The  idea  of  dignity  has  itself  a  strong  political  connotation.  First,  as  I  have already noted, political institutions are those which have the greatest impact on                                                         
17 This is broadly in line with the dominant Kantian understanding of dignity as tightly related to human self‐directing agency. For an interesting corrective to that understanding, which places more emphasis on self‐consciousness, and to which I am sympathetic, see Goodin (1981).  
18  This  account  of  what  respect  for  dignity  demands  is  very  broad.  It  is,  in  other words,  an account  of  the  concept  of  respect  for  dignity,  as  opposed  to  a  specific  conception  of  it.  On  the distinction between concepts and conceptions see Rawls (1999a, 5). 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our life prospects and to a large extent establish the necessary social conditions for us to lead decent lives, and pursue our ends. Moreover, the context in which the  dynamics  of mutual  recognition  grounding  a  person’s  self‐respect  actually take  place,  is  a  political  or  public  one  (typically  within  societies).  As  Jack Donnelly  says:  ‘[a]ny  plausible  account  of  human  dignity  must  include membership  in  society’  or,  I  would  add,  in  a  functional  equivalent  thereof (Donnelly 2003, 26).19 We  can  then  see  how  universal  human  rights  relate  to  both  dignity  and 









Finally, let me now turn to the third and last respect in which human rights can be  said  to  be  political.  In  this  sense  human  rights  are  political  insofar  as  their existence depends on what is ‘politically feasible’ in the here and now. Whether X qualifies as a human right, depends on there being the necessary socio‐political conditions  successfully  to  secure  X.  As  Joseph Raz  (2007,  19  emphasis  added) puts it, interests may be fundamental, but whether they give rise to a right or not depends ‘on the contingencies of the current system of international relations’. In a  similar vein, Sangiovanni  (2008, 155) argues  that we should make sure that  the  human  rights  we  advocate  do  not  end  up  being  ‘instrumentalized  or appropriated  by  states  in  the  pursuit  of  unrelated  foreign  policy  aims’ (Sangiovanni  2008,  156,  for  a  similar  claim  see  also  Raz  2007,  12‐13)21.                                                         
20 I try to lay the foundations of such a theory in Valentini (2010). 
21 In Raz’s words (2007, 12‐13) ‘When the international situation is one in which it is clear that international  measures  will  not  be  applied  impartially,  that  they  will  be  used  to  increase  the domination  of  a  super‐power  over  its  rivals,  or  over  its  client  states  etc.,  the moral  principles setting  limits  to  sovereignty  will  tend  to  be  more  protective  of  sovereignty  than  in  the relationship  among  states  which  exists  within  a  union,  like  the  European  Union,  which  has relatively impartial judicial institutions and fairly reliable enforcement procedures’. 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Considering the right to freedom of speech, he goes on to argue that it should not be recognized as an international human right because of ‘the danger that strong nations will instrumentalize the right to pursue self‐serving goals’, and ‘the lack of  adequate  international  mechanisms  to  ensure  ex  ante  and  ex  post accountability’ (Sangiovanni 2008, 160). Making  human  rights  contingent  on  the  ‘current  system  of  international relations’ strikes me as too conservative (see Tasioulas 2009). It definitely allows us  to  understand  human  rights  as  ‘political’  but,  once  again,  at  the  cost  of depriving them of much of their critical capacity. The fact that a human right to free  speech  might  be  instrumentalized  does  not  seem  to  be  good  enough  a reason  for  saying  that  the  human  right  does  not  exist.  If  anything,  it  is  a  valid reason  for  arguing  that  those  states which use  such  a  right  to  justify  action  in pursuit of their self‐interest act unjustly. This does not mean that the right does not  exist,  or  that  it  should  not  be  part  of  the  conditions  for  the  legitimacy  of political  communities.  Instead,  it  means  that,  here  and  now,  in  our  non‐ideal world,  we  are  better‐off  (strategically)  if  we  do  not  treat  it  as  a  condition  for foreign intervention. Notice moreover  that Sangiovanni  (2008, 154) himself  admits  that a  certain account  of  human  dignity  or  human  needs  can  be  part  of  our  justification  of human  rights,  but  such  an  account  ‘will  be  fundamentally  shaped  by  the  role human  rights  are  intended  to  play  in  current  international  practice’.  It  seems, however, philosophically dubious to argue that (1) human rights are grounded in human dignity;  (2) human dignity  requires  freedom of  speech;  (3)  if,  here and 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now,  we  were  to  allow  foreign  intervention  (whether  soft  or  hard)  on  the grounds of freedom of speech we would probably do more harm than good, and hence (4) there is no human right to freedom of speech. In so saying, I am not suggesting that feasibility considerations should not be part of a meaningful account of human rights. But when  it  comes  to  feasibility, we should distinguish between what we might call robust and weak infeasibility (see the discussion in Räikkä 1998). Let me consider each of them in turn. 
Robust  infeasibility  represents  the  sort  of  infeasibility  which  makes  the realization of a certain goal  impossible or unreasonably costly  for now and the foreseeable  future.  So,  for  instance,  a  right  to  ‘superabundance’  would  be preposterous  precisely  because  moderate  scarcity  seems  to  be  one  of  the defining features of the human condition. If ‘ought implies can’, then there can be no duty to achieve something which, by definition, human beings cannot achieve. Similarly, think about a right to have the opportunity to go to the moon (Miller 1983, 74) or  to a cure  for a very rare disease  (Griffin 2008, 99).  In both cases, there is a sense in which the objects of these rights are feasible. If we devoted a large amount of resources to technological innovation in the area of space travel, or to medical research on that particular disease, perhaps trips to the moon, and cures for rare diseases, would become available to everyone. The problem with these two proposals is that the interests they are meant to safeguard do not seem weighty enough to justify the costs involved in protecting them.  It would be absurd to  take political  institutions  to be bound by duties  to make  trips  to  the moon  and drugs  to  cure  rare  diseases  available  to  everyone given that this would involve removing resources from the pursuit of much more urgent and important goals, such as basic health care for everyone, the fulfilment 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of  fundamental physical needs  and  so  forth. Denying  the  existence of  a human right  –  i.e.,  of  an  interest  which  political  institutions  have  a  duty  to  protect  – because of its robust infeasibility seems to be a perfectly legitimate philosophical move.  Failing  to  take  robust  infeasibility  seriously  is  likely  to  lead  us  to overinflate  the  language of  rights  in general, and of human rights  in particular, thereby  depriving  it  of  much  of  its  moral  force.  But  what  about  weak infeasibility? By weak infeasibility I mean the sort of infeasibility which does not depend on the  tragic  nature  of  the  ‘circumstances’  in  which we  live,  but  on  people’s  and governments’  unwillingness  to  act  in  the ways morality  requires.  Consider  the following  example.  Many  believe  that  wealthy  westerners  have  a  duty  to contribute  to  alleviating  global  poverty.  From  a  moral  point  of  view,  the existence of such a duty seems to me rather uncontroversial. In the same way in which  it  would  be morally  monstrous  to  let  a  child  drown  in  a  shallow  pond when  saving  him  would  only  cost  us  a  trip  to  the  launderette  (Singer  1972), letting children in developing countries die when saving them would only cost us a few dollars seems morally repugnant. That said, we are also very much aware of  the  fact  that  wealthy  westerners  are  unlikely  to  be  moved  by  this  sort  of argument.  Typically,  people  seem  to  be  prepared  to  make  sacrifices  for  their fellow  nationals,  but  are  much  less  ready  to  do  so  when  it  comes  to  distant strangers.  But  should  this  generalized disposition  to  do  good  at  home,  but  not abroad,  count  as  a  reason  for denying  the  existence of  a  duty  to  relieve  global poverty? I take it the clear and obvious answer is ‘no’. People’s weakness of will, or insensitivity to what morality requires of them, should have no effect on what morality actually requires of them (see Carens 1996, and Estlund 2007, ch. 14). 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Proponents  of  the  political  view  like  Raz  and  Sangiovanni  may  agree  with what I am saying here. After all, their views are not so implausible as to suggest that what human rights require corresponds to what states are likely to do. Their claim  is  more  complex.  Assuming  the  function  of  human  rights  to  be  that  of legitimizing  international  intervention,  they  urge  us  to  take  into  account  the likelihood  of  abuse  of  human  rights  on  the  part  of  powerful  nations.  What  if proclaiming a human right to X ended up having counterproductive effects?  I believe this is a reasonable worry, but I dispute the way in which proponents of  the  political  view  address  it  in  their  accounts  of  human  rights.  It  seems hypocritical  to  suggest  that,  an  interest  which,  under  conditions  of  full compliance would generate a human right, should not be regarded as the basis for a human right in conditions of partial compliance, where agents are unlikely to do what morality requires of them. If we follow this sort of reasoning, we run the risk of becoming too complacent with existing political practice, making our moral theories hostage to injustice. A more promising way of taking into account practical difficulties in designing a theory of human rights would be to adopt the following two‐tiered structure. First, at the level of ideal theory, we ask ourselves what  human  rights  people  have  –  i.e.,  what  interests  should  be  universally protected by the institutional arrangements under which they live, given robust infeasibility  constraints.  Second,  at  the  level  of what,  following Rawls  (1999a), we  might  call  non‐ideal  theory,  we  ask  which  policies  and  distribution  of responsibilities would  best  realize  the  human  rights  in  question.  It might  very well be  true  that, under existing circumstances, we should not regard a human right  to  freedom  of  speech  as  a  trigger  of  international  military  intervention because of the risks of abuses of power this would carry with itself. However, we 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could  very  well  posit  that  a  violation  of  such  a  right  legitimizes  international criticism or some other form of international sanction.  The point is that, if freedom of speech is the type of interest which we believe should  be  protected  by  political  institutions  for  them  to  be  legitimate,  then freedom of speech should count as a human right. The best, or most appropriate way to protect such a right – i.e., to define the duties correlative to such a right –will vary with circumstances.  Notice  that  this  is  not  equal  to  robbing  human  rights  of  their  deontological force,  by  somehow downplaying  the  duties  correlative  to  them  (O’Neill  1996). The  point  is  not  that  human  rights  are  ‘vaguely  defined  goals’  which  some institutions,  somewhere, ought  to  realize. Rather,  the point  is precisely  that,  to take the duties correlative to human rights seriously, we must look at the current configuration of our institutional order and allocate them accordingly. Moreover, we must also be able to  identify moral  failures when agents’  lack of motivation leaves important human rights unfulfilled (cf. Sen 2004).   
Conclusion 
My  aim  in  this  paper  has  been  to  explore  the  different  ways  in  which  a conception  of  human  rights  can  be  ‘political’  and  to  establish  whether  any  of these ways  is worth pursuing.  In particular,  I  have  looked at  three dimensions along which  a  conception  of  human  rights  can  be  political  (dimensions which proponents  of  the  ‘political  view’  often  fail  to  distinguish):  its  iudicandum,  the way its principles are justified, and its relation to political feasibility constraints. Specifically,  I have argued the following. First,  it  is appropriate to regard the duties correlative to human rights as falling on political institutions rather than 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individuals.  However,  it  is  mistaken  to  take  states’  foreign  policy  as  being necessarily  the  relevant  iudicandum. This makes  a  theory  of  human  rights  too tied to the status quo and fails to be loyal to the multi‐faceted nature of human‐rights  practice.  Second,  the  justification  of  human  rights  may  plausibly  be political not because of a practical concern with stability, but because of a moral concern  with  public  justifiability.  Interestingly,  if  we  take  such  a  concern seriously  and  proceed  to  justify  human  rights  by  appeal  to  the  fundamental values  informing human‐rights practice, we are  forced  to engage  in  the kind of 
controversial, first‐order, moral reasoning which proponents of the political view downplay or  seem  to want  to avoid. This  suggests  that  the difference between political  and  natural‐law  approaches  is  smaller  than  advocates  of  these  two outlooks often suggest. Finally,  I have argued  that while  it  is  important  to  take feasibility constraints into account in designing a theory of human rights, not all types of feasibility constraints matter. The fact that agents are unlikely to act on the basis of what morality requires of them does not suffice to deny the existence of certain human rights. Of course, much more work needs to be done in order to design a full‐blown political account of human rights. However,  in this paper I hope to have shown that (i) human rights may be seen as political in a relevant sense, and (ii) where some of the existing versions of the political account go wrong. 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